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ABSTRACT 
 
SME often lack the capacity to keep transparency in management due to a small number of information users. Thus, 
the adoption of K-IFRS can be burdensome to numerous SME, which led to the enactment of Accounting Standards 
for Small- and Medium-sized Entities (AS-SME). AS-SME allows the accountants to easily implement accounting 
rules when writing financial statements and the users to comprehend useful information.  
 
SME hold less tax burden since they receive a tax deduction and exemption from the Tax Act. Thus, we conjecture 
that the financial determinants of tax avoidance between SME and non-SME will differ. We divide the total sample 
according to the corporate tax avoidance and empirically examine whether the difference actually exists.  
 
Our sample consists 18,954 audited firms including those external audited from 2011 to 2013. This study 
implements BTD, the difference between accounting profit and taxable income and estimated corporate tax 
avoidance (TS), which is the part that cannot be explained by total accruals in BTD to proxy for tax avoidance. 
(Desai and Dharmapala 2006). 
 
We summarize our findings as below: there is a significant distinction between SME and non-SME regarding the 
related financial determinants. The result shows that firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV), 
operating cash flow(CFO), capital intensity (PPE), R&D intensity (RNDS), and growth rate (GS) all influence the 
corporate tax avoidance of SME. Our result also suggests that there is variation in the determinants among the SME 
with high corporate tax avoidance.  
 
The attempt to investigate the financial determinants of the tax avoidance in SME can be a barometer of the 
effectiveness of AS-SME, which is enacted to lessen the tax burden of the SME. We intend to provide policy 
implication regarding SME subsidy by examining the motive for corporate tax avoidance in SME. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ccounting enables numerous information users to make rational decisions by providing the useful 
information and is considered to be substantial in internationalizing and diversifying financial 
economy. The Korean financial market, as an attempt to enhance accounting transparency and 
establish East Asia financial hub mandated Korean International Financial Reporting Statements (K-IFRS) instead 
of Korean Generally Accepted Accounting Principal (K-GAAP) to all listed firms and financial institutions from 
2011. Adopting K-IFRS led to both improving international credibility and stimulating the financial market. Firms 
with a relatively small number of information users mostly lack accounting capacity and even hold no obligation for 
external audit. Accounting Standards for Small- and Medium-sized Entities, (AS-SME) is legislated for these firms 
for the accountant to easily understand the accounting rules when making financial statements and to provide useful 
information to information users’ decision making from 2014. Following the enactment of AS-SME, we expect that 
A 
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such different accounting standards1 following business surroundings can influence financial determinants and 
corporate tax avoidance among SME. 
 
Effective tax rates (ETR) is generally adopted to proxy for corporate tax avoidance. It provides information about 
the tax burden of a firm and influence of tax on business. We use both book-tax gap (BTD) which is the difference 
between accounting profit and taxable income and TS, the estimated corporate tax avoidance proposed in Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) to proxy for tax avoidance. Then we investigate numerous determinants that affect decision-
making process relevant to finance, investment and operation activities. 
 
Plethora of studies on tax avoidance focused on listed firms; however little attention was given to SME. Along with 
the K-IFRS adoption, the enactment of AS-SME has changed the accounting environment for SME. Following 
enactment of AS-SME, the significance of studies that underscore subsidizing SME increased. We conjecture SME 
have fewer motives for tax avoidance than non-SME for they are beneficiaries of the tax cut provisions and tax 
subsidy from SME aid policy. Moreover, unlike general listed firms, SME contain distinctive financial structure. 
Thus, we investigate financial determinants that influence SME’s corporate tax avoidance. 
 
Tax avoidance is defined as an ambiguous firm conduct that can either implicitly or explicitly diminish the tax 
burden of the firm. If the taxing authority determines the tax avoidance of the firm as tax evasion rather than tax 
saving, the firm is charged with direct tax including the originally imposed tax and the additional tax amount. Yet 
aside from direct tax expense, the firm confronts indirect tax burden which encompasses social condemnation and 
following stock price crash as well as sales decrease (Anderson & Frankle, 1980; Richardson & Welker, 2001; 
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & Yang, 2010; Andrews et al., 2019). As contradictory stances exist, the present study intends 
to find financial determinants of tax avoidance in SME and empirically explain the underlying motive of tax 
avoidance in SME. In the additional analysis, we find financial determinants that affect the involvement degree in 
tax avoidance among the SME. 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section Ⅱ, we describe the previous literature and the 
enactment of AS-SME. In Section Ⅲ we present the hypotheses and research model, and in Section Ⅳ we present 
the empirical results of financial factors that explain corporate tax avoidance of SME. Concluding remarks 
encompassing summary and limitations are discussed in Section Ⅴ. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON AS-SME AND TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
2.1 AS-SME (Accounting Standards for Small- and Medium-sized Entities) 
 
2.1.1 Background of AS-SME Enactment 
 
The firms enlisted on the Korean financial market is mandated to report the financial statement following IFRS 
rather than K-GAAP from 2011 in an attempt to elevate accounting transparency and to establish East Asia’s 
financial hub. Such radical changes in accounting environment alter the quality of accounting information and 
indirectly have an impact on the firm’s information users, not to mention the firm’s financing and investing 
activities. Since the firms are obligated to apply K-IFRS when writing their financial statement from 2011, the fiscal 
year also starts from 1st of January, 2011. 
 
Due to the difficulty in adopting IFRS, there had been a continuous demand for the accounting standard for small 
SME, where the number of information users is relatively marginal and accounting capacity is in short. The 
requested standard should be easy to use for the accountant as well as provide useful information for decision 
making. Recent reform in enforcement decree of Commercial Act1 allowed the Minister of Law to determine 
additional accounting standards for financial reporting with regards to firms not subjected to external auditing. 
Mainly focused on the transactions that take place in SME, AS-SME was enacted. AS-SME was simpler than K-
                                                
1 The Commercial Act Enforcement 15 (Accounting Principle) requires the Minister of Law to discuss with Financial and Service Commission 
and Small & Medium Business Administration then notify accounting standards for those public firms not subjected to ‘Act on external audit’ nor 
‘public institutions regulation’ 
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GAAP and easier to adopt thereby reducing the adoption expense. some of AS-SME provisions differ from that of 
general accounting standards. 
 
 
Table 1. Proportion of Firms by Size 
Panel A. Firm Categorization by the Commercial Act 
Category Stock Companies LLC 
Limited 
Partnership 
Unlimited 
Partnership Total 
Number of firms 417,876 17,554 3,750 843 440,023 
Percentage (%) 95.0 4.0 0.9 0.2 100.0 
 
Panel B. Firm Categorization by Firm Size 
Category Number of Firms Percentage (%) 
Firm Size General Corporation 89,134 20.3 Small and Medium Corporation 350,899 79.7 
Total 440,023 100.0 
 
Panel C. Listed and Unlisted Firm 
Listed Corporation Unlisted External Auditing 
Corporation 
Listed Corporation, Corporation 
Not Including Unlisted External 
Auditing Corporation 
Total Securities KOSDAQ 
759 1,013 16,826 421,425 440,023 1,772 
Note: Corporation Statistical Yearbook (Fiscal Year 2010) 
 
 
Table 1 demonstrates descriptive statistics regarding the number of corporations in the Korea financial market in the 
year 2010. Panel A displays that among corporations, stock company constitute the most, approximately 95%, 
limited liability corporation (LLC) accounts for 4%, and partnership for roughly 1%. Panel B categorizes total 
corporations into small and medium size and general corporation according to the firm asset. According to SME 
standard, a number of small and medium-sized firms is 350,889, which is 80% of the total corporations on 
December 2010. Among these SME, firms subjected to external auditing2 numbers 18,589 and stock-listed 
corporation, 1,772. The number of firms categorized as SME is 421,425, which is 96% of the total firms and the rest 
including listed firms and firms subjected to external auditing accounts for 4%. As is seen in the numbers, even 
though the majority of corporations are SME, the Korean market concentrated on K-IFRS centered on listed firms. 
SME mostly have a relatively small number of information users and conduct simple transactions. Moreover, many 
SME firms are inept in accounting treatment. Thus, the necessity of adopting simple and clear accounting standards 
for SME has been raised.  
 
2.1.2 Comparison of the Existing Accounting Standards   
 
Accounting standards in Korea encompassing K-IFRS, K-GAAP, and AS for SME are tabulated in Table 2. The 
subjects of K-IFRS are the stock-listed corporation and financial institution. Those firms among the subject of 
external auditing not implementing K-IFRS are required to adopt K-GAAP. Ensuing the Commercial Act reform, 
firms not employing public enterprise accounting principle encompassing K-IFRS and K-GAAP can implement AS 
for SME. We summarize the type of corporations mandated and the law on which the obligation is based with 
regards to each accounting standard.  
 
 
Table 2. Accounting Standards Categories 
Category K-IFRS K-GAAP AS-SME 
Corporation under 
Obligation 
Stock-listed corporation and 
financial institutions (excluding 
some institutions) 
Corporations subjected to 
external auditing regulation not 
implementing K-IFRS  
Firms adopting neither K-IFRS 
nor K-GAAP nor public 
enterprise accounting standards 
Basis Law Act on external audit Article 13 (1) 1 and article 7-2 
Act on external audit Article 13 
(1) 2 
Commercial Act Article 446-2, 
(15) 3  
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Whereas the adoption of K-IFRS or K-GAAP in the listed firms and financial institutions can be less burdening, the 
implementing K-IFRS or K-GAAP can be a setback for SME due to overweighing workload and additional expense. 
Therefore, accounting standards for SME that are easy to understand and apply and that provide useful information 
to information users are in great need. The crux for AS for SME is establishing accounting standards that do not 
conflict with other acts and that meet the demand for easy usage and understanding of the accounting treatment. As 
Table 3 demonstrates, AS for SME adopts Commercial Act unlike K-GAAP and requires the statement of financial 
position and statement of revenue and expense as the main financial statement and additional statement of equity 
changes or statement of retained earnings. The rest of the information are recommended to be detailed in the 
footnote. Although it is customary to compare previous and the corresponding fiscal year when writing the financial 
statement, AS for SME only allows writing for the corresponding fiscal year. 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison in Financial Statement 
Category K-GAAP AS-SME 
Commercial Act 
(Financial Statement of 
Corporation) 
Corporate Taxation Law 
(Corporate Tax Addendum) 
Basic 
Financial 
Statement 
• Statement of Financial 
Position 
• Statement of Revenue 
and Expense 
• Statement of Changes 
in Equity 
• Cash Flow Statement 
• Footnote(Including 
Statement of 
Appropriation of 
Retained Earnings or 
Statement of 
Disposition of Deficit) 
• Balance Sheet 
• Statement of 
Revenue and 
Expense 
• Statement of 
Changes in Equity or 
Statement of 
Appropriation of 
Retained Earnings 
(Statement of 
Disposition of 
Deficit)  
• Balance Sheet 
• Statement of Revenue 
and Expense 
• Statement of Changes in 
Equity or Statement of 
Appropriation of 
Retained Earnings 
(Statement of 
Disposition of Deficit)  
• Statement of Financial 
Position 
• Statement of Comprehensive 
Income 
• Statement of Appropriation 
of Retained Earnings 
(Statement of Disposition of 
Deficit)  
Etc.  Other footnotes are 
only recommendation  
Corporations subjected to 
act on external audit are 
required to include cash 
flow statement and 
footnote according to 
Commercial Act 
Corporate Taxation Law 
requires adopting the financial 
accounting standards. When 
submitting through Taxation 
Information and 
Communication Service, 
Balance Sheet and Statement 
of Revenue and Expense are 
required.  
Note: Partial revision from AS for SME public draft 
 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
2.2.1 Definition of Tax Avoidance and Determinants  
 
Many researchers have the different concept of tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). As seen in Figure 1, tax 
evasion is at the end of the spectrum when we visualize the categories of tax avoidance. Tax evasion is considered as 
violating Tax Act, which imposes the evaded tax and a fine. If the violation of Act is turn out to be deliberate, then 
the conduct can be called tax fraud and criminal punishment can be enforced. The other end of spectrum exhibits tax 
planning or tax saving, all of which are an act of tax reduction adhering for the intention of the government 
authority. Tax avoidance is placed in between tax reduction strategy and tax evasion. Simply put, tax avoidance 
refers to act of reducing tax not meeting the intention of the law yet those that do not directly violate the regulations. 
Since tax avoidance itself is not a violation of the law, it is not a subject for criminal punishment but is levied the tax 
unpaid when seen as inappropriate. It requires a vast amount of professional knowledge in a sense that it has to both 
be conducted within the brim of the law and avoid tax in an unintended way. Thus, the taxation professionals 
organize a thorough tax avoidance strategy.  
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Even though it is distinctive in concept, the boundary between tax avoidance and tax evasion is inconclusive in 
practice. A particular act can be equivocally determined as tax avoidance or socially accepted tax reduction strategy. 
Defining the same act may vary with time. For example, the taxation authority can claim a certain conduct as tax 
avoidance; on the other hand, the judicial branch of government can determine it as a tax reduction strategy. In such 
case, the taxation authority will be discontented and reform the Tax Act to define similar conduct as illegal in the 
long term. If the judicial branch of government refers to such act as not violating any article, yet socially 
unacceptable tax avoidance that distorts the intention of the law, then the taxation authority can justifiably impose 
the tax. When the decision of the judicial branch is divulged to the public, similar conducts will be identified as tax 
evasion, not tax avoidance.  
 
 
Figure 1. Categorizing Tax Avoidance 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Financial Determinants of Corporate Tax Avoidance and Research on SME Tax Avoidance 
 
The extant literature on corporate tax avoidance from the early 1990s have examined tax burden according to the 
individual firm, industry and characteristics using effective tax rate. It has been found that effective tax rate differs 
according to the leverage, export ratio, capital intensity and technology investment besides the firm size (Kim & 
Ahn, 1994). By contrast, corporate tax avoidance is found to be positively related to effective tax rate, profitability, 
capital expense burden, and corporate structure. Additionally, it has been demonstrating negative relations with the 
tax incentive (Koh, 2006).  
 
Kim and Ahn (1994) examined whether there exist a difference in corporate tax from the year 1989 to 1991 by 
running a regression of effective tax rate on various control variables including the firm size, leverage, export ratio, 
capital intensity, investment in technology. Their results showed an insignificant relation between corporate tax 
burden and firm size and significantly negative relation between the rest of the variables and corporate tax burden. 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted using the estimates from Desai and Dharmapala (2006) from the year 2000. 
Koh (2006) suggested the corporate tax avoidance tends to display positive relation with tax burden (marginal tax 
rate), profitability, capital expense burden as well as ownership structure. At the same time displayed negative 
relation with tax incentives (TSE). The results suggest excessive tax burden can naturally entail motive for corporate 
tax avoidance. 
  
Kim and Jung (2006) examined the influence financial factors have on corporate tax avoidance using the sample of 
enlisted firms with nonnegative estimated taxable income from the year 2000 to 2005. They implemented the 
measure from Desai and Dharmapala (2006) to proxy for corporate tax avoidance. They found corporate tax 
avoidance increased along with the total asset size and earnings before tax and decreased as liabilities increased. 
Their study held a limitation of estimating taxable income based on the tax paid. 
 
Illegal Legal 
Tax Evasion Tax Avoidance Tax Planning 
“vice” 
(Tax Crime) “virtue” 
Impose tax 
Additional tax 
Criminalize 
Impose tax 
No Additional tax 
No penalty 
Impose tax 
Additional tax 
No penalty 
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Kim and Kim (2013) estimated corporate tax avoidance in long-term with an assumption that the impact of tax 
planning lasts in long-term. They used long-term corporate tax avoidance estimate from Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) including GAAP ETR, CASH ETR, CURRENT ETR, TAX ETR, and ETR Differential. They concluded that 
most firms not only avoid tax in short-term but also in long-term. Additionally, they also found that there are 
representative financial determinants that affect tax avoidance. Such determinants are firm size (SIZE), leverage 
(LEV), capital intensity (CAPIN), inventory rate (INVIN), R&D intensity (RNDIN), return on asset (ROA), export 
rate (FRGN), auditor size (BIG4), and auditing compensation (LNFEE). 
 
Previous research on SME tax avoidance are as follows. Yoon and Bae (2001) conducted survey to the main 
accountants in SME to examine the factors that influence the corporate tax avoidance. Their results showed that tax 
burden and factors related to taxation administration both contain positive relation with tax avoidance. On the 
contrary, tax ethics and the factors that hinder corporate tax avoidance all demonstrated negative relation with tax 
avoidance. Thus, it is intuitive as the researchers have conjectured in the first place; the accountants tend to conduct 
less corporate tax avoidance when considering the sanctions yet they become more active when the tax burden is 
high. Whereas Yoon and Bae (2001) conducted an empirical research with a dataset from one country, Lee and 
Yoon (2011) engaged in cross-sectional research. They contrasted the difference in factors that influence corporate 
tax avoidance in both Korea and Indonesia. They found high tax rate entailed tax avoidance and complexity of the 
tax act and stronger sanctions on tax avoidance all reduced corporate tax avoidance. Furthermore, their study 
confirmed the pervasiveness of corporate tax avoidance in the market as well as unfairness in tax all entailed high 
corporate tax avoidance. They also enumerated the financial factors that have an impact on corporate tax avoidance 
including firm size, capital intensity, with a positive influence and profitability and the existence of tax investigation 
experience, with negative influence. 
 
Cho, Park, and Lee (2011) also conducted the financial traits that prompt corporate tax avoidance from the year 
2005 to 2009 with a sample of firms listed on KOSDAQ. They presented the positive relation between tax avoidance 
and tax burden besides firm size. On the other hand, tax incentive and capital intensity all held negative relation with 
tax avoidance. Thus, firms with either larger tax burden or large size are likely to conduct tax avoidance whereas the 
firms receiving benefits from tax incentives are less likely to conduct tax avoidance. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Hypotheses 
 
3.1.1 Tax Avoidance and Financial Traits 
 
This literature intends to find financial determinants that influence tax avoidance. We set our first hypothesis (H-1) 
about the relation between tax avoidance financial determinants including firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), 
profitability (ROA), operating cash flow (CFO), capital intensity (PPE), R&D intensity (RNDS), sales growth (GS), 
export rate (ES) 
 
Firstly, firm size (SIZE) can possibly influence tax avoidance in two contradictory ways. According to political cost 
theory, larger and successful firms are likely to be the scapegoat being imposed more restraints and required wealth 
transfer due to higher visibility. (Zimmerman, 1983) Thus, we conjecture that larger firm size will entail higher tax 
avoidance tendency. On the other hand, according to political power theory where large firms can pressure the 
political process in their favor through taxation strategies thus attain more resource to organize the firm’s operation 
for optimal tax savings, firm size is hypothesized to negatively affect tax avoidance tendency. Therefore, we 
establish a hypothesis (H 1-1) to confirm the relations between firm size and tax avoidance. 
 
Secondly, the firm’s financing and investment decisions can have an impact on tax avoidance since the tax 
provisions allow distinct accounting rules related to the firm capital structure and its decision on asset composition. 
(Stickney & McGee, 1982; Gupta & Newberry, 1997). Firms with higher leverage (LEV) can decrease the tax 
through the tax shield from the financial loss calculation of interest expense, so are likely to have less tendency to 
conduct tax avoidance; whereas firms with low leverage have more motive to conduct tax avoidance. We establish a 
hypothesis (H1-2) to test this. 
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Thirdly, it is plausible that since Tax Act endows tax incentives to stimulate firm investment, firm asset composition 
influence tax avoidance. (Stickney & McGee, 1982; Gupta & Newberry, 1997). Firms with depreciable assets have 
increased depreciation expense and can implement non-liability tax reduction effect through depreciation expense 
and tax exemption from an investment. Thus, higher capital intensity (PPE) may lead to lower tax avoidance 
tendency due to depreciation expense and tax exemption. Yet high capital intensity can increase depreciation 
expense and the firm can make attempts to manipulate by decreasing the useful life of the asset, choosing the 
depreciation method, categorizing the expenditure. This leads to a high possibility of committing tax avoidance. To 
capture such possibility, we come up with a hypothesis (H1-3). 
 
Fourthly, profitability (ROA) through the firm’s operation can influence tax avoidance. Since the tax is determined 
by the profit earned, the manager can commit tax avoidance when the firm’s profit increases. Hypothesis (H1-4) is 
established to test this. 
 
Both firm’s operating cash flow and sales growth can affect tax avoidance tendency. The increase in the former can 
induce more tax burden to the firm thereby can positively influence tax avoidance tendency. Also, the sales growth 
which is calculated by subtracting current year sales from that of the previous year and dividing the previous year 
sales can influence tax avoidance. Hypotheses H1-5 and H1-6 capture the influence of operating cash flow and sales 
growth on tax avoidance, respectively. 
 
Additionally, R&D intensity (RNDS) provides tax reduction related to investment in that it can instantaneously 
exempt expense whereas its benefit is typically realized over a long term. An additional amount in R&D also entails 
tax exemption from an investment. Thus, we conjecture firms with high R&D intensity are less likely to conduct tax 
avoidance if there are tax incentives related to R&D intensity. We include a hypothesis (H1-7) to investigate the 
possible negative relation between R&D intensity and tax avoidance. 
 
Moreover, the government, in an attempt to promote exporting industry supports zero percent taxation when the 
transaction is considered to be export according to Value-Added Tax Act. So when tax incentive related to export 
exists, firms with high export rate have less incentive to conduct tax avoidance, indicating a negative relation 
between tax avoidance and export rate. This relation will be examined through hypothesis H1-8. 
 
H1: Tax avoidance in SME is related to the firm’s financial characteristics  
 
H1-1: Tax avoidance in SME is related to the firm size (SIZE) 
H1-2: Tax avoidance in SME is related to the firm leverage (LEV) 
H1-3: Tax avoidance in SME is related to the firm capital intensity (PPE) 
H1-4: Tax avoidance in SME is related to the firm total asset profitability (ROA) 
H1-5: Tax avoidance in SME is related to the firm operating cash flow (CFO) 
H1-6: Tax avoidance in SME is related to the firm sales growth (GS) 
H1-7: Tax avoidance in SME is related to the firm R&D intensity (RNDS) 
H1-8: Tax avoidance in SME is related to the firm export rate (ES) 
 
3.1.2 Relation Between Tax Avoidance and Auditor Characteristics 
 
Tax avoidance in SME can be influenced by auditor characteristics, specifically the auditor quality. We include 
auditor size and auditor findings to proxy for the auditor quality. The extant studies that adopted auditor size (BIG) 
as a proxy for the auditor quality categorized BIG4 which consists of large auditors and Non-BIG4 to investigate 
whether there is a difference in audit quality (Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1989). Higher audit quality will be required 
to larger auditor size due to auditor reputation and image. It is plausible that difference in tax avoidance between 
SME that received proper audit findings (AD) and those that received otherwise. When relatively small SME receive 
proper audit findings, these firms have less motive for tax avoidance due to increased reliability in the financial 
statement. On the other hand, those that did not receive proper auditor's report are likely to commit tax avoidance. 
Thus, tax avoidance in SME may differ following the size of the auditor and the auditor’s report, to capture the 
relations of which we set hypotheses H2-1 and H2-2, respectively. 
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H2: Tax avoidance in SME is related to auditor characteristics 
 
H2-1: Tax avoidance in SME is related to auditor size (BIG4) 
H2-2: Tax avoidance in SME is related to auditor findings (AD) 
 
3.2 Variables Measurement and Modeling 
 
3.2.1 Measuring Tax Avoidance 
 
The present study estimates corporate tax avoidance using book-tax difference (henceforth BTD). BTD is incurred 
either through increasing earnings on the financial report (earnings manipulation) or through decreasing taxable 
income (tax avoidance). In some cases, firms use both means to maximize the firm value. Based on such reasons, we 
can implement BTD to proxy for corporate tax avoidance. Extant studies on tax avoidance using BTD also proved 
that the difference in BTD was related to the firms that committed tax avoidance. 
 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) introduced a new measurement to proxy for tax avoidance with an assumption that the 
difference between accounting profit and taxable income is attributable to earnings manipulation and tax avoidance. 
They calculated abnormal BTD (discretionary part) by regressing BTD on total accruals thereby ruling out normal 
BTD (non-discretionary part). This calculation controlled for the earnings manipulation part from total accruals. The 
recent research has adopted the estimation from Desai and Dharmapala (2006).  Following the convention, the 
present study adopts the methodology in Desai and Dharmapala (2006) to estimate the corporate tax avoidance. 
Despite the difference in between the tax structure in the US and Korea, we adopt the measure from Desai & 
Dharmapala (2006) to accurately capture tax avoidance by eliminating the effect of earnings manipulation. 
 
BTD is calculated by subtracting taxable income from accounting profit and dividing the result by total asset as 
shown in (Eq. 1). We present the measure proposed in Desai and Dharmapala (2006) as (Eq. 2). The residual 
variable of (Eq. 2) is the corporate tax avoidance (TS) 
 
 𝐵𝑇𝐷$,& = (())*+,&$,-	/,)*0123454671	/,)*01)3*&47	(991&   (Eq. 1) 
 
 𝐵𝑇𝐷$,& = 𝛽;𝑇𝐴$,& + 𝜀$,& 𝑇𝑆$,& = 𝜀$,& (Eq. 2) 
 
BTDi,t ＝ (earnings before tax-taxable income)/total asset of firm i in term t 
TAi,t ＝ (net income-operating cash flow)/total asset of firm i in term t 
TSi,t ＝ estimated corporate tax avoidance of firm i in term t 
 
The dependent variable of (Eq. 2) is BTD and the independent variable is total accruals which is the difference 
between accounting profit and operating cash flow. The measure by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) has an advantage 
in that it can decrease measurement error by separating the earnings manipulation from BTD. In this vein, we regard 
total accruals as earnings manipulation proxy as it was identified in Desai and Dharmapala (2006). 
 
3.2.2 Model 
 
This literature investigates financial determinants that are associated with tax avoidance in SME. We use BTD and 
TS to proxy for tax avoidance and conduct a regression analysis as in (Eq. 3). 
 𝑇𝑆$,&(𝐵𝑇𝐷$,&)=𝛼@+𝛼;𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$&+𝛼D𝑅𝑂𝐴$&+𝛼G𝐿𝐸𝑉$&+𝛼J𝐶𝐹𝑂$&+𝛼M𝑃𝑃𝐸$&+𝛼O𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑆$&+𝛼Q𝐺𝑆$&+𝛼S𝐸𝑆$& 
+𝛼T𝐴𝐷$&+𝛼;@𝐵𝐼𝐺4$&+YD+IND+𝜀$,&  (Eq. 3) 
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BTDi,t = (accounting profit-taxable income)/total asset 
TSit = estimated corporate tax avoidance proposed in Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
SIZEi,t = logarithm of total asset 
ROAi,t = net income/total asset 
LEVi,t = total liabilities/total asset 
CFOi,t = operating cash flow/total asset 
PPEi,t = (tangible asset-land-asset under construction)/total asset, 
RNDSi,t = R&D/total sales 
GSi,t = (sales during current term-sales during previous term)/sales during previous term) 
ESi,t = sales from export/total sales 
ADi,t = 1 if the auditor's report is unqualified, otherwise 0 
BIG4i,t = 1 if the auditor firm is BIG4, otherwise 0 
YD = year dummy variable 
IND = industry dummy variable 
ε = Residual 
 
The definitions of BTD and TS are introduced in the previous section. Here we enumerate the financial determinants 
that, we speculate to be, are related to BTD or TS. Firms with high profitability (ROA) are anticipated to be more 
active in tax avoidance.  Firms with high leverage (LEV) might be relatively passive due to tax shield through 
interest expense. Firm size (SIZE) has an ambiguous effect on tax avoidance for it is plausible that the large firms 
are likely to plan competitive tax strategy, yet according to political cost theory, are likely to be less involved in tax 
avoidance. Since firms with high capital intensity (PPE) have various means to reduce tax, they are less likely to 
conduct tax avoidance. 
 
Firms with greater operating cash flow may be more involved in tax avoidance (Koh, Kim & Choi, 2007; Koh & 
Park, 2011). R&D intensity, due to tax reduction and exemption clauses is conjecture to be negatively related to tax 
avoidance. If the firm has positive sales growth (SG) then it will be more active in tax avoidance to minimize cash 
outflow from the increased sales. Firms substantially relying on export (with high export rate (ES)) tend to hold less 
motive in tax avoidance. Firms with proper audit findings (AD) or those audited by the large auditors (BIG4) also 
have less motive for tax avoidance. We control for the annual and industrial difference through dummy variables. 
   
3.3 Sample 
 
The present study uses the sample data from 2011 to 2013 extracted from the firms listed on the Korea Stock 
Exchange including the firms subjected to external audit2. We exclude those firms that meet the following criteria 
and finalize 18,754 firms as total sample data:  
 
- in the financial industry or of which accounts close in other months than December 
- with impaired capital or into administration 
- where the data cannot be found 
 
We illustrate the sample selection process. Firstly, we extract from Kis-value from 2011 to 2013 the listed firms and 
the subjects of external audit. Then we omit the firms in the financial industry from the sample since the financial 
statements of financial institutions are different from that of the manufacturing firms in the format and explanation. 
The majority of the listed firms close accounts during December. To keep the consistency in measurement and for 
the sake of convenience in interpreting the result, we remove the firms in the financial industry and firms with 
accounts closing period other than December, respectively. Thirdly, we intend to exclude the abnormal firms since 
their financial information can be considerably dissimilar to that of a normal firm. Lastly, we extract the financial 
data from Kis-value and remove some unavailable data. We identify the observations that exceed 1% distribution as 
the outlier, therefore, conduct 98% winsorization. Our final total sample comprises 18,754 firms. 
 
  
                                                
2 We extract from Kis-value from 2011 to 2013 the listed firms and the subjects of external audit. (https://www.kisvalue.com/web/index.jsp) 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2017 Volume 33, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 384 The Clute Institute 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis  
 
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the total sample. In the total sample, the mean and median of BTD 
are 0.0132 and 0.0079, respectively and those of TS are 0.0004 and –0.0034. As seen in the statistics over SME, the 
distribution of TS is again skewed to the right. The standard deviation of BTD and TS are 0.0677 and 0.0647 among 
SME and 0.0682 and 0.0652 for the total sample. There is only a marginal difference in tax avoidance among firms.  
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics (n=18,754) 
Variable Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max 
SIZE 24.1878 1.1576 20.4027 23.4010 23.8868 24.6890 32.6733 
LEV 0.1460 0.1704 0.0000 0.0242 0.0855 0.2059 1.0356 
PPE 0.1984 0.1760 0.0000 0.0638 0.1543 0.2835 0.9859 
RNDS 0.0116 0.0392 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0060 0.9836 
CFO 0.0811 0.1009 -0.7656 0.0138 0.0640 0.1283 1.0144 
ROA 0.0786 0.1043 -0.4972 0.0246 0.0587 0.1125 2.1327 
GS 0.1217 0.4446 -0.9930 -0.0461 0.0593 0.1953 6.8556 
ES 0.0000 0.1020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
AD 0.9400 0.2380 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BIG4 0.2200 0.4120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
BTD 0.0132 0.0682 -0.7495 -0.0085 0.0078 0.0326 0.8625 
TS 0.0004 0.0652 -0.7797 -0.0221 -0.0034 0.0220 0.8397 
Note: Explanation on Variables 
BTD = (accounting profit-taxable income)/total asset, TS ＝ estimated corporate tax avoidance proposed in Desai and Dharmapala (2006), SIZE 
＝ logarithm of total asset,  ROA ＝ net income/total asset,  LEV ＝ total liabilities/total asset, CFO ＝ operating cash flow/total asset, PPE ＝ 
(tangible asset-land-asset under construction)/total asset, RNDS = R&D/total sales, GS = (sales during current term-sales during previous 
term)/sales during previous term, ES = sales from export/total sales, AD = 1 if the auditor's report is unqualified, otherwise 0, BIG4 = 1 if the 
auditor firm is BIG4, otherwise 0. 
 
 
Table 5 demonstrates Pearson correlation among main variables. The tabulated result exhibits a positive relation 
between TS and ROA, LEV, CFO, PPE, and RNDS whereas a negative relation between TS and SIZE. ES, and AD 
hold insignificant relation.  
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Table 5. Pearson Correlation among Main Variables 
 SIZE ROA LEV CFO PPE RNDS ES GS AD BIG4 
TS -.036
*** .397*** .015* .301*** .061*** .051*** -.009 .116*** -.001 .011 
.000 .000 .052 .000 .000 .000 .253 .000 .886 .161 
SIZE 1 -.036
*** -.073*** .048*** -.020** -.001 .012 -.036*** -.007 .041** 
 .000 .000 .000 .011 .887 .114 .000 .377 .000 
ROA  1 -.211
** .411** -.176** -.034** -.007 .225** -.002 -.002 
  .000 .000 .000 .000 .377 .000 .775 .792 
LEV   1 -.129
*** .425*** -.002 -.006 .049*** -.004 -.005 
   .000 .000 .764 .467 .000 .630 .488 
CFO    1 .050
*** -.018** -.024*** .088*** .001 .015 
    .000 .023 .002 .000 .935 .053 
PPE 
    1 -.036*** -.005 .031*** .000 .035*** 
     .000 .503 .000 .953 .000 
RNDS 
     1 .006 -.023*** -.005 -.009 
      .449 .004 .517 .265 
ES 
      1 -.010 .009 .063*** 
       .181 .260 .000 
GS 
       1 -.016** -.004 
        .040 .612 
AD 
        1 .083*** 
         .000 
 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
We run our main regression model to find the significant financial traits and tabulate the results in Table 6. The 
results related to TS, one of the proxies for corporate tax avoidance, are as follows. Firm size (SIZE) holds 
significant and negative effect on corporate tax avoidance with a coefficient value of –3.300. This implies that SME 
with smaller size is more likely to conduct corporate tax avoidance and also substantiates political power theory. As 
mentioned in the sections before, political power theory contends that large firms can establish favorable tax 
planning and contain more resource to structure firm activity for optimal tax reduction. Thus, it underpins that large 
firms hold less motive for corporate tax avoidance. 
 
We also find that profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV), operating cash flow (CFO), capital intensity (PPE), R&D 
intensity (RNDS), and sales growth (GS) all have a positive impact on corporate tax avoidance, corroborating the 
previous studies. Higher profitability (ROA) naturally increases the management’s attempt to avoid tax by earnings 
smoothing. Operating cash flow (CFO) induces tax burden thus also holds positive relation with corporate tax 
avoidance. Firms with high leverage (LEV) are the beneficiary of interest tax shield thereby have less motive to 
avoid tax. However, ironically, firms subsidized with the tax deduction or exemption are more likely to avoid tax as 
they cannot reduce the tax from tax shield. 
 
Furthermore, high capital intensity (PPE) entailing more discretion in determining depreciation expense leads to 
corporate tax avoidance. Generally, R&D intensity (RNDS) raise corporate tax avoidance due to the tax reduction 
means inherited in investment expense. Firms are likely to appropriate such tax incentives related to R&D 
investment. Sales growth also leads to corporate tax avoidance. On the contrary, the export ratio (ES), auditor’s 
report (AD) and auditor size (BIG4) all held insignificant relations with corporate tax avoidance. 
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Table 6. Regression Analysis Result 
Variable 
TAX Avoidance 
TS BTD 
Coeff. t(p-value) Coeff. t(p-value) 
Intercept -0.007 -0.701 0.015 1.496 
SIZE -0.001 -3.300*** -0.001 -3.651*** 
ROA 0.225 44.976*** 0.363 71.972*** 
LEV 0.028 9.293*** 0.024 8.084*** 
CFO 0.102 20.527*** 0.083 16.559*** 
PPE 0.032 11.118*** 0.032 11.043*** 
RNDS 0.117 10.145*** 0.111 9.578*** 
GS 0.002 2.183** 0.001 1.240 
ES -0.001 -0.330 -0.002 -0.462 
AD -0.000 -0.048 0.000 -0.242 
BIG4 0.001 1.193 0.001 1.185 
YD Included Included 
IND Included Included 
N 16,740 16,740 
Adj. R2 0.203 0.259 
F-value 426.836 (0.000)*** 
585.653 
(0.000)*** 
Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance level, respectively. 
2. Explanation on Variables 
BTD = (accounting profit-taxable income)/total asset, TS ＝ estimated corporate tax avoidance proposed in Desai and Dharmapala (2006), SIZE 
＝ logarithm of total asset,  ROA ＝ net income/total asset,  LEV ＝ total liabilities/total asset, CFO ＝ operating cash flow/total asset, PPE ＝ 
(tangible asset-land-asset under construction)/total asset, RNDS = R&D/total sales, GS = (sales during current term-sales during previous 
term)/sales during previous term, ES = sales from export/total sales, AD = 1 if the auditor's report is unqualified, otherwise 0, BIG4 = 1 if the 
auditor firm is BIG4, otherwise 0., YD    = year dummy variable, IND = industry dummy variable. 
 
 
We run an additional regression to examine the difference in financial attributes between high corporate tax 
avoidance group and low corporate tax avoidance group and tabulate the results in Table 7. There is a discrepancy 
between two groups in terms of financial characteristics. In the high corporate tax avoidance group, firms size 
(SIZE) has significant and positive effect on tax avoidance. This result is contradictory to what we observe in Table 
6 and supports political cost theory. The theory claims that large and successful firms receive more attention thereby 
become a scapegoat of regulations and imposed more tax (Zimmerman, 1983). Based on such stance, large firms 
commit more tax avoidance. As Table 6 delineates, higher profitability (ROA) and R&D intensity induce the 
corporate tax avoidance. Both leverage (LEV) and sales growth (GS) lead to tax avoidance. As mentioned in the 
previous part, SME that receive tax reduction or exemption can benefit less from tax shield from interest thereby 
tend to avoid tax. On the other hand, firms with high capital intensity (PPE) show less tax avoidance.  
 
The major difference between the results for low tax avoidance groups using TS as a proxy appears in a couple of 
financial traits. R&D intensity offers investment related tax incentives over a long period of time all of which can be 
exempted through expense. Thus, when the tax incentive related to R&D intensity exists, the firms with high R&D 
intensity are less likely to conduct tax avoidance. We conjecture sales growth (GS) to raise tax avoidance yet the 
result shows otherwise. The strong explanation for this phenomena is the effectiveness of the government tax 
subsidy, i.e., the tax reduction or exemption leads the firms with high sales growth not to avoid tax.   
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Table 7. Regression on high tax avoidance group and low tax avoidance group 
 TAX Avoidance 
Variable HIGH TS LOW TS HIGH BTD LOW BTD Coeff. t(p-value) Coeff. t(p-value) Coeff. t(p-value) Coeff. t(p-value) 
Intercept -0.061 -4.312*** -0.087 -5.740*** -0.060 -4.190*** -0.098 -6.321*** 
SIZE 0.003 4.839*** 0.001 1.697* 0.003 5.312*** 0.002 3.254*** 
ROA 0.350 55.329*** 0.069 9.712*** 0.442 65.111*** 0.142 18.243*** 
LEV 0.044 9.146*** 0.016 3.435*** 0.046 9.350*** 0.009 1.886* 
CFO 0.006 1.051 0.043 5.409*** 0.076 11.034*** 0.021 2.823*** 
PPE -0.012 -2.884*** 0.006 1.212 -0.010 -2.177** 0.014 3.011*** 
RNDS 0.090 5.839*** -0.140 -7.320*** 0.089 5.558*** -0.172 -8.299*** 
GS 0.007 5.104*** -0.012 -7.076*** 0.004 3.143*** -0.010 -5.922*** 
ES -0.008 -1.217 -0.005 -0.687 -0.003 -0.501 -0.011 -1.511 
AD 0.004 1.336 0.001 0.457 0.003 1.108 0.002 0.558 
BIG4 0.002 1.476 0.001 0.513 0.002 1.358 -0.000 -0.010 
YD Included Included Included Included 
IND Included Included Included Included 
N 5,580 5,580 5,580 5,580 
Adj. R2 0.405 0.051 0.467 0.085 
F-value 380.510 (0.000)*** 
30.878 
(0.000)*** 
489.895 
(0.000)*** 
52.711 
(0.000)*** 
Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance level, respectively. 
2. Explanation on Variables 
HIGH / LOW (BTD) = (accounting profit-taxable income)/high or low total asset, HIGH / LOW (TS) ＝ estimated corporate tax avoidance 
proposed in Desai and Dharmapala (2006), SIZE ＝ logarithm of total asset,  ROA ＝ net income/total asset, LEV ＝ total liabilities/total asset, 
CFO ＝ operating cash flow/total asset, PPE ＝ (tangible asset-land-asset under construction)/total asset, RNDS = R&D/total sales, GS = (sales 
during current term-sales during previous term)/sales during previous term, ES = sales from export/total sales, AD = 1 if the auditor's report is 
unqualified, otherwise 0, BIG4 = 1 if the auditor firm is BIG4, otherwise 0., YD  = year dummy variable, IND = industry dummy variable. 
	
	
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Accounting Standards for Small- and Medium-sized Entities (AS-SME) is enacted to meet the needs of the SME 
that often lack the accounting capacity. AS-SME provides easiness in writing the financial statement along with 
convenience for information users. Aside from such legislation, the government authority has provided numerous 
tax incentives including tax reduction and exemption to SME. Our initial guess is that SME are less likely to avoid 
tax as they are the beneficiary of the Tax Act. 
 
Still, following the extant studies, there exists the possibility that SME conduct tax avoidance to maximize the firm 
value. Thus, we intend to examine the financial traits of SME that leads them to corporate tax avoidance, which can 
be lethal if discovered by the taxation authority. In addition, we empirically investigate the different factors that 
influence tax avoidance by dividing the total sample into two groups: low tax avoidance group and high tax 
avoidance group. 
 
This study, following the convention of corporate tax avoidance literature, adopts the measures developed by Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006), precisely the book-tax difference (BTD) and estimated tax avoidance (TS). We find that 
profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV), operating cash flow (CFO), capital intensity (PPE), R&D intensity (RNDS), 
and sales growth (GS) all have a positive impact on corporate tax avoidance, confirming the previous studies. The 
main difference between the high and low tax avoidance groups lies in R&D intensity and sales growth. 
 
The findings from this study offer policy insight with regards to subsidizing SME. At the same time, the financial 
traits from the result can be considered as meaningful factors when evaluating SME value. 
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ENDNOTES 
     
 
1Implementation of accounting standards in the Korea Market 
 
Classification Until 2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 2013 After 2014 
Firms pre-adopting IFRS   Korean International Financial Reporting Statements(K-IFRS) 
Listed firms    
Unlisted firms 
Korean Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principal(K-GAAP) 
 
  
Firms pre-adopting SME  Accounting Standards for Small- and Medium-sized Entities (AS for SME) 
 
2 Stock companies subject to external audit (Act on external audit of stock company) 
 
Approximate Standard 
(Before end of previous accounting period) Stock-Listed 
• Total Asset over 10 billion Stock-listed corporation 
• Total asset over 7 billion • Total liability over 7 billion 
• Total employee over 300 
Stock company converting to stock-listed corporation in corresponding 
or next accounting period. 
 
External auditing standard: (98.4) Asset 7 billion à(09.1) Asset 10 billion à(09.10) Asset 10 billion liability 7 billion, 
employees over 300 
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NOTES 
